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Abstract
Cheating is a part of everyday life and is prominent aspect in the competitive nature of business. The ultimate
goal of cheating is to gain an advantage over your competitors and ultimately be successful. Even though
cheating is considered wrong, why do people still do it? The risk of being caught and punished is seemingly
outweighed by the reward of success from cheating. This concept is relevant in the sporting world as well with
the violation of rules by college athletic programs. In the highly competitive division I level of intercollegiate
athletics the goal is to be the best. To be the best you must have the best coaching staff and acquire the best
players. Not only do programs have to fight other programs to get players, they must keep those players
satisfied and eligible even if it means violating rules to do so. National Collegiate Athletic Association
(NCAA) violations are frequently occurring throughout the world of collegiate athletics at the division I level.
These violations come at both the major and secondary level, while major violations provide a significant
competitive advantage for programs. The NCAA committee of infractions hands down sanctions to violating
programs to prohibit these competitive advantages and promote fair competition throughout, however their
jurisdiction has been seemingly ineffective throughout history (Ribock, 2012). The purpose of this research
was to examine the relationship between NCAA sanctions for major violation and the future success of the
violating programs. From the research I have conducted, I found that generally, teams remain unaffected when
it comes to athletic success after sanctions set in place by the NCAA. The inadequate sanctions, lack of
enforcement and monitoring of violations actually reinforce cheating in intercollegiate athletics because the
sanctions often do not affect the future success of athletic programs.
These sanctions are often avoidable but through possible reform, the NCAA could improve their techniques
to further enforce fair competition throughout. I expect this research to continue to provide evidence that
sanctions handed down by the National Collegiate Athletic Association rarely effect the success of athletic
programs on the field in the time period after. Gaining a competitive advantage over your opposition through
the cheating process is something that will be nearly impossible to ever abolish and fully monitor, which leads
to an increase in violations against the governing body of the NCAA, especially when the sanctions don’t
always have lasting effects.
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Abstract 
 Cheating is a part of everyday life and is prominent aspect in the competitive 
nature of business. The ultimate goal of cheating is to gain an advantage over your 
competitors and ultimately be successful. Even though cheating is considered wrong, 
why do people still do it? The risk of being caught and punished is seemingly outweighed 
by the reward of success from cheating. This concept is relevant in the sporting world as 
well with the violation of rules by college athletic programs. In the highly competitive 
division I level of intercollegiate athletics the goal is to be the best. To be the best you 
must have the best coaching staff and acquire the best players. Not only do programs 
have to fight other programs to get players, they must keep those players satisfied and 
eligible even if it means violating rules to do so. National Collegiate Athletic Association 
(NCAA) violations are frequently occurring throughout the world of collegiate athletics 
at the division I level. These violations come at both the major and secondary level, while 
major violations provide a significant competitive advantage for programs. The NCAA 
committee of infractions hands down sanctions to violating programs to prohibit these 
competitive advantages and promote fair competition throughout, however their 
jurisdiction has been seemingly ineffective throughout history (Ribock, 2012). The 
purpose of this research was to examine the relationship between NCAA sanctions for 
major violation and the future success of the violating programs. From the research I 
have conducted, I found that generally, teams remain unaffected when it comes to athletic 
success after sanctions set in place by the NCAA. The inadequate sanctions, lack of 
enforcement and monitoring of violations actually reinforce cheating in intercollegiate 
athletics because the sanctions often do not affect the future success of athletic programs. 
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These sanctions are often avoidable but through possible reform, the NCAA could 
improve their techniques to further enforce fair competition throughout.  I expect this 
research to continue to provide evidence that sanctions handed down by the National 
Collegiate Athletic Association rarely effect the success of athletic programs on the field 
in the time period after. Gaining a competitive advantage over your opposition through 
the cheating process is something that will be nearly impossible to ever abolish and fully 
monitor, which leads to an increase in violations against the governing body of the 
NCAA, especially when the sanctions don’t always have lasting effects. 
Introduction 
In just about every facet of life there are those who are willing to cheat in order to 
receive what they want or to be the best. It seems that programs believe they have the 
ability to cheat without any repercussions.  In the world of college athletics, cheating is 
just as relevant and comes in numerous forms. For coaches, players and athletic 
departments, the sanctions set in place by the NCAA for major violations seem to be 
relatively ineffective in deterring them which makes the  could be  the reward of ultimate 
success, bragging rights and even financial gain much easier to obtain. In the assessment 
of the relationship between NCAA sanctions and future success of athletic programs, the 
winning percentage of major revenue division I athletic programs in the years following 
the sanctions for major violations. I am performing this research in hopes to answer the 
ultimate research question of whether or not there is a relationship between NCAA 
sanctions and athletic program success on the field.  This research is relevant because the 
analysis of the relationship between sanctions and success can reveal possible flaws in 
the monitoring and control systems the National Collegiate Athletic Association has in 
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place and can aid in possible reform (Potuto, 2010). By discovering the results of 
sanction and success, the public will be able to see whether or not the National Collegiate 
Athletic Association is following their purpose and mission of fair competition in 
intercollegiate athletics.   
Literature Review 
The NCAA is one of the major governing bodies of collegiate athletics. It is 
divided into multiple levels while this study focuses on major revenue division I Football 
Bowl-Subdivision (FBS) teams that have committed major violations since the year 2000. 
Teams are classified in the FBS if they are in a major conference which is eligible for a 
bid to the Bowl Championship Series (BCS) games. They are also classified by the 
specific number of scholarships that they can offer to individual player. The FBS consists 
of 120 football teams and 348 Men’s basketball teams, which were the taget of this 
research.  
Under National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) regulations, there are 
two types of violations that can occur within a program or athletic department; these are 
major and secondary violations which encompass numerous categories of wrongdoing.  A 
major violation entices a drastic competitive advantage for a certain program or 
department while secondary violations are isolated and provide somewhat of a minor 
competitive advantage. Naturally, a secondary violation has a seemingly less severe 
structure of sanction than that of a major violation. The NCAA presents rigid definition 
for both forms of violations. A secondary violation is “an isolated or inadvertent violation 
that provides (or intends to provide) only minimal recruiting, competitive or other 
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advantages. Secondary violations occur frequently and are usually resolved 
administratively.” (NCAA pp.1, 2013) While a major violation “usually provides an 
extensive recruiting or competitive advantage. Alleged major infractions are investigated 
by enforcement staff and can lead to severe penalties against the school and involved 
individuals.” (NCAA pp.2, 2013) When assessing the reward being greater than the risk 
of sanction, most programs look long term and at the big picture. Often times sanctions 
set in place by the NCAA on violators both at the major and primary levels will not 
drastically affect the competitiveness of the program long term thus enticing coaches, 
players and departments to proceed with violations (Summary of ncaa, 2011). 
The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) is a governing body with 
rules and regulations in place to promote fair competition all throughout (Jones, 2012). 
These regulations include things such as amateurism, recruitment, improper benefits, 
drug use, financial aid, expenses, ethical conduct, and academic standards (NCAA, 
2013). Although these regulations are in place, it is widely believed that violations occur 
on a daily basis at the Division I level and due to poor enforcement and sanction by the 
NCAA, violations continue to occur. Violations over the recent years in numerous 
programs haven’t seemed to hinder athletic success (Baxter, Margavio & Lambert, 1996). 
Major programs such as the University of Indiana, Boise State University, West Virginia 
University, Georgia Tech University, The University of Oregon, The University of 
Tennessee, Ohio State University, Samford University and The University of North 
Carolina have all been on the receiving ends of sanctions put down by the NCAA yet 
have remained successful on the field. These violations came in both the major and 
secondary variety from players, coaches and athletic departments. Even after the 
RUNNING HEAD: NCAA SANCTIONS  6 
violations, the programs continued to prosper athletically even after paying the price of 
sanction (Dohrmann; Hackney; Harden; Pierce; Polsinello; Sturgis; Thomas & Wagner, 
2011).   If violations of these rules result little to no sanction whatsoever, and the possible 
sanctions don’t have a drastic effect on the success of programs, there would be no reason 
to cease breaking of the rules. There are certainly violations occurring behind closed 
doors that are never exposed as departments and programs have adapted to the changing 
times and have been able to fly under the radar of NCAA jurisdiction (Otto, 2005).  
On the other hand, major division I programs are often under more intensive 
watch and held to higher standards in the media making it much harder to avoid 
accusations and sanctions. Major revenue sports are constantly under the spotlight of the 
media and governance in comparison to non-revenue sports. This spotlight results in a 
higher scrutiny and a more intense watch under the NCAA to abide by regulations 
(Humphreys, 2012). Although this study is open to all sports at the division I level, most 
of the prominent cases of violations that result in public and severe sanctions are involve 
major revenue sports such as men’s basketball and football programs. This is often due to 
an idea of more competition not only for competition, but revenue reasons as well 
(Danna, 1998). There are cases of major violations in all sports however, in most 
women’s sports (both revenue and non-revenue) and non-revenue men’s sports the 
violations generally occur at the secondary level. With the stress on self-reporting of 
violations and the idea that secondary violations can be corrected within the institution 
itself rather than through NCAA involvement, these secondary violations rarely surface 
or have effect on the long term athletic success of programs (Winfree & McCluskey, 
2008). 
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 If simply bending or breaking a rule can result in the betterment or your team or 
program and potentially result in a national championship, the reward in itself will be 
worth the risk of sanction. This in a sense encourages cheating from the many working 
parts within athletic departments across the country. Some specific violations can have 
direct benefits relating to the success of programs of all varieties at the Division I level. A 
prime example of this would be a recruiting violation. In pursuit of a top prospect a 
school could offer improper benefits or even contact a player outside of the allotted time 
periods in order to persuade that player to commit to a school. In turn, this results in a 
competitive advantage for programs that violate which could result in success on the 
field. Another violation that could benefit direct success is how a school or program 
handles violations that have occurred (Winfield, 2010). The self-reporting of violations is 
encouraged by the NCAA but if a program was aware of violations that have occurred 
within, they could withhold that information from the NCAA. By withholding this 
information that is undetected by the governing body, they could avoid sanctions on the 
program and individual players themselves which could continue to result in their success 
on the field (Marsh, 2009).    
The death penalty is the most severe form of sanction that the NCAA can enforce 
on a program for certain violations. It has only been used three times at the division 1 
level of college athletics, most notably on the Southern Methodist University (SMU) 
football program in 1987. This penalty prevents the program from participating in their 
sport for an allotted period of time. (NCAA, 2013)  Not only does this directly affect their 
ability to participate, but also the credibility of the program for the era after the death 
penalty as it is hard to recover from such a loss. When violations surfaced against SMU, 
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they were of both major and secondary stature and were mainly related to improper 
benefits and recruiting violations. The penalties were severe and cost SMU in the future 
of their football program. It resulted in the loss of the entire 1987 football season, loss of 
home contests in the 1988 season, loss of scholarships, no off campus recruiting for two 
seasons, and a limitation on the number of coaches hired on their staff. Some programs 
with severe violations have aroused the idea of the NCAA enforcing the death penalty 
once again. The University of Miami football program was under heavy speculation in 
the late 20th century with their unsung success in the football world and faced many 
allegations and penalties due to their player benefits and recruiting violations yet still 
didn’t receive the death penalty, which sources said seemed deserving (Fusco, 2011). 
This lack of enforcement by the NCAA could be causing the continuation of violations. 
The most prominent issues causing the reward to be greater than the risk involve 
the specific sanctions put in place by the NCAA. With minimal enforcement and 
sanctions put in place on violators, they are likely to become repeat offenders whether it 
be at the major or secondary level. Ribock stated “the NCAA has been enabling cheating 
with their lack of enforcement as they thought it set the example for every institution that 
violates the NCAA bylaws when it punished Southern Methodist University (SMU) with 
the “death penalty.” The situation at SMU, however, did not provide the necessary forum 
for the NCAA to send a message to coaches who violate NCAA bylaws. There should be 
stricter sanctions for coaches who violate each bylaw, and not just sanctions for 
outrageous and grievous violations such as those that occurred at SMU. The death 
penalty at SMU is an extreme example of the widespread cheating that goes on in college 
athletics; the principle, however, should be noted. If the NCAA does not punish coaches 
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who violate the bylaws, they will continue to do all they can to win, even if that means 
violating rules. Coaches know the NCAA will not strictly punish them unless they lie to 
NCAA investigators or commit a major violation”.(Ribock, p. 393-394, 2011) 
Violations at the division I level can begin during the recruiting process. To be 
successful on the field, a number of variables must work in your favor including having 
the most talented players. Coaches, alumni and athletic departments are willing to do 
whatever it takes to land the top recruits even if that means breaking the rules. Between 
the years of 2001 and 2011 53 of the 120 universities at the bowl subdivision level were 
found to have committed violations both major and secondary. Of those 53 schools, 21 
committed recruiting violations which can range from duration of phone calls to improper 
benefits (Lederman, 2011). With the increase in competitive awareness and sport as a 
source of revenue to institutions, violations are on the rise as every school is fighting to 
be the best. The number of violations has more than tripled in the new millennium 
compared to the twenty years prior (McGee, 2011).  
The next steps following recruiting a student-athlete to an institution are to keep 
that individual eligible and satisfied. Often, those steps require violating NCAA rules and 
regulations. A recent study of male division I football and basketball programs expressed 
that seventy percent of admitted to committing NCAA violations, typically at the 
secondary level. These secondary violations consisted of benefits to enhance the stay of 
athletes such monetary bonuses (under $50) and free meals. Major violations were 
prevalent in the study and consisted of improper benefits (cars, apartments, and cash) and 
academic fraud. Even with the student-athletes openly admitting to violating rules, every 
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participant in the survey expressed that neither them, their program, nor their athletic 
department were ever punished for the violations (Cullen, Latessa & Jonson, 2011).  
Studies have shown that the inadequate sanctions set in place by the NCAA as a 
governing body in fact encourage and enable cheating. These inadequate sanctions make 
the reward seem that much greater than the risks, and at a competitive division one level, 
the price of winning is incredibly high. By enabling cheating within programs and 
athletic departments, the validity and fairness of competition plummets. It even 
contradicts the purpose of the NCAA, which is to promote fair competition throughout. 
(NCAA, 2013) By not carrying a big stick, the NCAA is allowing players, coaches and 
departments to either get away scot-free from the two tiers of violations, or setting in 
place minimal sanctions which do not affect the competitiveness or long term success of 
the program. A specific measure of the reward being worth the risk could be measured by 
win percentage and championships post-violations and sanction. If the sanction doesn’t 
seem to have an effect on these outcomes, it could seem that the reward of success was 
worth the risk of violating (Depken & Wilson, 2006). It is apparent that only the death 
penalty has proven to be an effective form of sanction on programs.  
Coaches are often the biggest violators of the NCAA jurisdiction but have the 
easiest out. Many coaches jump ship to the professional level of their sport or even 
change schools when there is the first sign of sanction being set in place. This allows for 
them to first, avoid the sanction and its effect on the program whatever that may be and 
second, assure themselves another job in fear that they may lose their position at the 
current school. Most recently in college football and basketball, coaches have been 
leaving schools to turn professional or just resigning to avoid the liability. Chip Kelly, 
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former University of Oregon head football coach, just accepted a head coaching job in 
the National Football League (NFL) as violations surfaced within the program (Wagner, 
2013). Both Pete Carroll, former head coach of the University of Southern California 
football team and Jim Tressel, former Ohio State University football head coach, left 
their programs at the first sight of violations to avoid sanction. Tressel resigned while 
Carroll left for a position in the NFL. The ability for coaches to jump ship avoiding 
sanction only entices them to violate more, making the reward worth the risk (Stangel, 
2000). However, there are alternative variables that could be contributing factors to 
coaches jumping ship. Salaries in professional sports are often greater than that at the 
collegiate level as well as a greater opportunity. In these cases it could be coincidence 
that head coaches are leaving while violations are surfacing. Coincidence seems like a 
viable option when a coach leaves for a professional or better paying position as the 
opportunity may be greater. Suspicion arises when a coach simply resigns from his/her 
position because prima fascia would leave outsiders to believe that the coach is leaving to 
avoid sanction. Also, the two-tier structure of violations allows coaches to commit 
numerous amounts of secondary violations without any severe forms of sanction. Often 
times these secondary violations occur during the recruiting process giving schools an 
unfair advantage over the competition. The tiers leave no room for a middle ground as 
they only represent polar opposites, major violations could end a program while 
secondary violations could be shrugged off as if they were never even committed 
(Ribock, 2012).  
A study of division I college athletics has shown that the increase in success and 
championships within a certain athletic program can lead to future violations as there is 
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often an uneven balance of sanction distributed to successful programs (Johnson, 1992).  
However, with the success and power of these programs comes the technique and ability 
to avoid sanction and fly under the radar of the NCAA watch. Most prominently in 
division one football programs, Bowl Championship Series (BCS) championships can 
directly lead to recruiting violations mainly at the secondary level. Statistics from this 
study show that recruiting violations increase in the season following a BCS 
championship because teams are fighting to rebuild and repeat (Dittmore & Crow, 2010). 
However, because of the poor enforcement and guidance of the NCAA, schools find the 
reward to be greater than the risk of sanction based on severity (Clark & Batista, 2009). 
As it can be seen through recent violations in the realm of college athletics, the 
sanctions put in place by the NCAA do not have as much of a long-term effect on athletic 
programs. Some programs that commit secondary violations or non-recruiting related 
major violations are able to rebuild with sanctions such as post season bans. A post-
season ban may result in the loss of motivation in an athletic department but it is a 
sanction that is easily rebounded from. In cases such as the Ohio State University 
Football team and University of Connecticut men’s basketball team, there have been 
minor sanctions set in place but their level of competitiveness has remained relatively 
stable throughout. The Ohio State University football program received a post-season 
ban, loss of scholarships and is currently under probation for secondary improper benefits 
violation yet continued to prosper in the 2012 football season posting an undefeated 
record (Penrose, 2012). The University of Connecticut men’s basketball program also 
received a single year post-season ban due to secondary academic progress violations 
(Winn & Hess, 2011). The Huskies still completed their season with 20-10 record. Both 
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programs success seemed to be unaffected on the field by the sanctions in place 
(Dorhmann & Epstein, 2011). Although they seemed to be unscathed on the field, these 
sanctions do have a price. Economic loss ensues as the schools lose out on major sources 
of revenue which occur during the post season. For Ohio State and the University of 
Connecticut, the attendance ratings for contests as well as merchandise sales were 
unaffected, in fact on the rise during the time of sanction however they still suffered in 
revenue losses (Sefner, Feinglass, 2012). 
Methods 
It is apparent throughout the history of collegiate athletics that major violations 
are a commonly occurring principle. The competitive and cutthroat nature of major 
division I athletics results in the strive for victory, at all costs. These costs often violate 
NCAA regulations which result in sanctions with the purpose to deter future violation. 
Over the last thirteen years, there have been multiple violations at the division I FBS 
level by major revenue sports and this research will identify the relationship between the 
sanctions and future athletic success of the violating programs.  
Research Tradition 
The most effective approach to this research will be the use of interpretivism. 
Interpretive approaches allow the researcher to explore and uncover explanations, rather 
than deduce them from measurements (Gratton & Jones, 2010). Using this approach I 
will be able to identify the relationship based on the analysis of athletic program success 
rates after violations rather than looking at measurements. While identifying this 
relationship, it is not necessarily represented numerically much like the positivist 
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approach. This data will require myself, the researcher, to search for the relationship 
based on the secondary data rather than using strictly quantitative information. The data 
will consist of both qualitative and quantitative information relating to NCAA violations, 
sanctions and program success.  Using the critical interpretivism expressed by Chris 
Gratton and Ian Jones, I will examine the historical information of major NCAA 
violations in the last thirteen years in attempt to see the truth behind the relationship 
between NCAA sanctions and the future on-field success of the violating programs 
(Gratton & Jones, 2012). This relationship isn’t necessarily direct as there are many 
variables related to success, but through this interpretivism approach I will understand the 
existence of a relationship between success and sanctions.  
This secondary information will come from the NCAA database of rules, 
regulations, and sanctions as well as their official reports on programs that have violated 
along with the sanctions handed to them. Academic journals and sources contain 
secondary information regarding past research done on lack of institutional control and 
inadequate sanctions by the NCAA and will relate to my hypothesis of the potential of 
athletic programs remaining successful on the field even after receiving sanctions from 
the NCAA. Many of these scholarly sources regarding past research and case studies on 
programs receiving sanctions from the NCAA, come directly from law review journals at 
accredited institutions such as the Marquette Law Review and the San Diego Law 
Review. The only qualitative measures in this study will be the different types of 
violations, while the quantitative measure will be of win percentages and win-loss 
records. I will also analyze team websites to explore their success post-violation and 
sanction to determine whether they were affected significantly. I will analyze the teams 
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win/loss records both overall and in conference and determine success based on 
improvement from previous years and an above .500 win percentage.  
The secondary information in place will consist of; the specific rules and 
regulations in relation to violations, reports on schools that have violated, how those 
schools violated, the specific sport and position that performed the violation/s, NCAA 
reports on the violations and the sanctions put in place, news and team sources related to 
the cases, past studies conducted on NCAA jurisdictions and school violations, athletic 
records of athletic success both pre and post violation, and efforts of reform the sanction 
process of the NCAA.  These violations will be both of major qualifications only in a 
variety of programs at the division I level of collegiate athletics at the revenue producing 
level. This revenue sports include men’s basketball and football only. After examining 
the violations and sanctions themselves, I will use the quantitative data from past studies 
and team sources regarding win percentage to further reinforce the hypothesis of 
sanctions leaving teams relatively unscathed on the field. This measure of success is the 
success of teams following their sanction; this success will be measured by win 
percentage and improvement.  By having a qualitative measure of success (win 
percentages), it will make the possibility of relating the inadequate sanctions by the 
NCAA having an irrelevant effect on win percentage of violating programs. If a program 
continues to prosper even after sanctions have been set in place, it will reinforce the idea 
that the violation itself did not have a direct effect on the athletic success and 
competitiveness of the team.  
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Conceptual Framework 
A majority of major violations occur at the division I FBS level as these renowned 
programs are often under a national spotlight. In addition to the spotlight, the competitive 
conferences they play in reinforce the idea of winning and often violating NCAA rules is 
the best way to gain a competitive advantage. There are a wide variety of violation types 
within the subcategories of major and secondary violations. There are over 4,000 
secondary violations reported every year in division I athletics but they are often solved 
internally or result in no punishment. In addition, secondary violations are not available 
to the public through NCAA legislation. Due to the severity of major violations and their 
resulting sanctions, the NCAA has a public database of major violators throughout 
history. 
With this information readily available, it seemed the majority of violations came 
from the major revenue sports including Men’s Basketball and Football. Through 
ineffective control and punishment by the NCAA, it seemed that sanctions were not 
deterring programs from violating rules as these violations continue to occur. The 
inadequacy of sanctions that are in place by the NCAA and the ease in which programs 
can avoid these punishments seemingly reinforce violations in college athletics (Ribock, 
2012). In everyday life, if we could cheat in order to obtain what we wanted with little to 
no punishment would we do it? There is question of morality within the violations of 
NCAA regulations but it is important to understand the reinforcement of cheating and the 
relevance of cheating in college athletics. College athletics, especially major revenue 
programs are driven through success and monetary gain. Monetary gain is often the result 
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of success therefore programs are seemingly willing to do whatever it takes to gain 
competitive advantages over their opponents, even if that means violating rules.  
Within this research exists many variables that could impact the results of the 
findings. Variables such as the time period of violation, type of major violation, type of 
sanction will all be controlled for in the data collection process. There are programs with 
multiple major violations that have received the heaviest form of sanctions and programs 
that are first time violators but both will be assessed as long as they fall under the major 
violation category. Program history in the analysis was the biggest concern as it would be 
tough to identify the relationship post-sanction of a team that has historically struggled 
before the violation itself. I will account for variables by separating the data by sport type 
(men’s basketball versus football) and by time period of the sanction. The history of 
athletic success will ultimately be a controlled variable in my comparison to success post-
sanction. I will measure the success of programs by analyzing the win percentage of said 
programs in a three-year period prior to the sanction. To be eligible for the research the 
team will have to hold an above five-hundred win percentage in that time period. 
Controlling these variables will allow for a random sample, eliminating data fishing and 
providing a fair assessment for the research. By highlighting the year of the sanction, and 
comparing win percentages of programs in the three year periods before and after, it will 
level the comparison in attempt to find a potential relationship between sanctions and 
future success. Although the specific violations may vary from case to case and program 
to program, categorizing them in major and secondary violations will also provide a 
better comparison. 
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Overall, the lack of ability to properly enforce rules, regulations and sanctions by 
the NCAA has led to an increase in violations throughout the world of division I athletics. 
While focusing on the big picture, which is ultimately success and winning, coaches and 
athletic departments see the reward of committing a variety of violations to be greater 
than the risk of deflated athletic success. There have been active movements to pursue 
rule changes in the NCAA as well as increase both the monitoring of schools and the 
severity of sanctions. The NCAA and committee of infractions, which is in charge of 
assessing violations and placing sanctions, have been under scrutiny for a lack of 
institutional control. It is believed that this lack of control is resulting in unfair play and a 
lack of competitive balance at the division I level so the NCAA is working to reform 
itself and its rules (Carroll, Mitten, Musselman, 2012).  By using past violations as a 
baseline and potential changes to the governing body that is the NCAA, it is hopeful to 
understand why the reward is seemingly greater than the risk to commit and the effect 
sanctions have on the athletic success of a programs. 
There are also variables that my research can control. It would not be possible to 
determine if the sanctions themselves directly affected the program’s success, rather it 
can only express a possible relationship between the sanctions and future success. 
Variables such as high quality players remaining on a team even with sanctions in place, 
high quality coaches remaining in programs and establishing reputation to limit the 
effects of the sanctions, and even the timing of the sanctions. If sanctions are placed 
down a team that has already maintained a quality recruiting class, they may be 
unaffected by the sanction. There are outside reasons beyond this study, like the influence 
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of academics, the could result in records improving, dropping, or remaining the same 
during NCAA sanctions, that cannot be controlled for.  
Theoretical Framework 
Previous research has stated that inadequate punishments by the NCAA have 
reinforced cheating and violation in college athletics. Through escape mechanisms such 
as transferring for players and “jumping ship” to other schools or professional leagues, 
key components of the violation process are able to avoid the repercussions of sanctions 
(Ribock, 2012). The punishments have been represented as ineffective as there has been 
no decrease in the number of violations over the years, rather an increase since the early 
1980’s (Pututo, 2010). This is the result of poor regulation and enforcement of 
regulations by the NCAA as a governing body as it has been a target of reform since the 
increase in unfair competitive advantages (Marsh, 2009). Throughout history the NCAA 
has only exercised its ultimate power of the “death penalty” a handful of times, even 
though this seems to be the only effective form of punishment in hindering athletic 
success and deterring future violations (Otto, 2005) 
 As a result of athletic success, there is an increase in violations at the FBS level as 
the demand for future success skyrockets based on expectations (Clark& Batista, 2009). 
This further reinforces that in the cutthroat world of competitive and money driven major 
revenue athletics, that the demand for success on and off the field somewhat justifies 
cheating.  
 Using the previous studies done on NCAA sanctions and the motives behind 
violations, I formed a hypothesis based on the analysis of team success based on win 
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percentages. I believe that the relationship between NCAA sanctions for major violations 
and success on the field is also a factor in reinforcing programs to commit violations as 
these punishments are often ineffective in hindering athletic success. I believe that teams 
will remain relatively unscathed as far as win percentages in the years after NCAA 
sanctions have been handed down. In turn, it will be more likely to see major violations 
occurring throughout college athletics when past programs have not been harshly affected 
by the sanctions.  
Design 
 For this research I will be studying samples of secondary data over an extended 
period of time. I will first be searching for records of major NCAA Division I football 
and men’s basketball programs that have sanctions against them from the year 2000 to 
2013. These sanctions will be the result of classified major violations at the FBS level. 
Next I will analyze their performance records in the three year period prior to the 
sanctions to make sure that they are eligible for the data collection as teams with 
historically under-performing records would not be included in the research. For the 
programs eligible based on previous record requirement, I will test their records in the 
years after the sanction and any season with a win percentage above .500% would be 
considered successful. This interpretation of records after the sanctions will hopefully 
establish a relation between sanctions and the success on the field for athletic program. 
The purpose of these sanctions are to deter violations and produce fair competition 
throughout however, if there are no negative repercussions relating to on-field success, 
what is there to shy away from?  
RUNNING HEAD: NCAA SANCTIONS  21 
Procedure 
 The data collection regarding win percentages both prior to sanctions and after 
sanctions can be accessed on program websites as well as the NCAA databases. News 
sources and the NCAA database also hold the data related to the specific type and time 
periods of sanctions by the major revenue programs at the Division I level. This 
secondary data is both qualitative and quantitative in nature. It is qualitative as it pertains 
to the different NCAA bylaws and specific sanctions for programs while the quantitative 
nature lies within the time periods and win-loss records for the programs prior to 
sanctions and post-sanctions.  
 The data will be gathered and separated by sport (men’s basketball and football) 
as well as by the program itself as some sanctions hit both sports within the same athletic 
program. Then begins the comparison between previous win-loss records before the 
sanctions and the win-loss records after sanctions. The previous win-loss records are 
primarily gathered in order to see if the programs are eligible for the study. The purpose 
of the records post-sanction are to see if there was any increase or decrease after the 
sanctions were in place. Through past studies and research I expect to find that teams 
remain relatively unaffected as far as athletic success goes in seasons after NCAA 
sanctions. 
Results 
 The data sample collected consisted of NCAA division I programs with reported 
violations since the year 2000. Of the two tiers of violation (major and secondary) this 
data pool consisted of only those with major violations of the two main revenue sports, 
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men’s basketball and football. The NCAA monitors 124 Football Bowl Subdivision 
(FBS) teams and these teams are separated from other programs by fitting certain 
requirements that were discussed more in depth in the literature review. Of these 124 
FBS schools, 29 schools have received sanctions from the NCAA since the year 2000 for 
both men’s basketball and football. The purpose of sanctions is to hinder the competitive 
advantage gained by violating the jurisdiction of the NCAA, which would seemingly 
result in poor on-field performance for violating programs. I analyzed the team’s records 
before and after the sanctions were handed down to see if there was any lasting effect on 
the win-loss percentage post-sanction. 
 It was predetermined that in order to be considered for data analysis, the teams 
had to hold an above .500% win percentage in a three year period prior to the sanctions. 
The reason for this is that it would not fit the criteria if a team had poor on-field 
performance prior to the sanctions as that could be the reason for their lasting struggles 
rather than the violation itself. Of the 46 total violating programs (both men’s basketball 
and football), half did not meet the previous record requirement so their data was not 
included in the post-violation record analysis. Upon further research of those  programs 
that did not reach the previous record requirement, over half of the programs records in 
both football and basketball have been on the rise showing the minimal effects of NCAA 
sanctions on programs, even though their data was not continued throughout. Other data 
that was included  in the collection process were the records and analysis of programs 
that had not committed any violations or programs that have committed strictly secondary 
violations. Secondary violations are often self-reported and the sanctions are much less 
severe, if there are sanctions at all. For the final data analysis, there were 23 total 
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School Program Reported Date Post-Sanction Record Year 1 Post-sanction Record Year 2 Post-Sanction Record Year 3
Arkansas State Men's Basketball 11-Mar-11 (22-11)
Texas Tech Football 7-Jan-11 (5-7) (8-5) (7-5)*
University of Michigan Football 1-Jan-03 (10-3) (9-3) (7-5)
Men's Basketball 1-Jan-03 (13-18) (22-11) (22-13)
University of Southern California Football 10-Jun-10 (8-5) (7-2) (7-6)
University of Cincinatti Men's Basketball 29-Sep-11 (26-11) (22-11)
Boise State University Football 13-Sep-11 (12-1) (11-2)
Georgia Institute of Technology Football 14-Jul-10 FB-(8-5) FB-(7-7)
Ohio State University Football 10-Mar-06 (12-1) (11-2) (10-3)
Men's Basketball 10-Mar-06 (35-4) (24-13) (22-11)
Univerity of NC at Chapel Hill Football 12-Mar-12 (8-4)
University of South Carolina Football 27-Apr-12 (11-2) (11-2)
Pennsylvania State University Football 23-Jul-11 (9-4) (8-4)
University of Alabama Football 11-Jun-09 (10-30 (12-1) (13-1)
Men's Basketball 11-Jun-09 (17-11) (25-12) (21-12)
Florida State University Football 6-Mar-09 (10-4) (9-4) (12-2)
Men's Basketball 6-Mar-09 (23-11) (25-10) (18-16)
University of Kansas Men's Basketball 12-Oct-06 (27-8) (33-3) (35-3)
Marshall University Football 21-Dec-01 (11-2) (8-4) (6-6)
University of Wisconsin, Madison Football 1-Oct-01 (5-7) (8-5) (8-5)
Men's Basketball 1-Oct-01 (19-13) (24-8) (25-7)
University of Miami Football 7-Jan-07 (5-7) (7-6) (9-4)
University of Arkansas, Fayetteville Men's Basketball 7-Jan-07 BB-(10-20) BB-(13-17) BB-(17-14)
programs eligible for the research (18 total schools). There were a total of 14 football 
programs and 9 men’s basketball programs that have committed major NCAA violations 
from 2000-2013 and were eligible for analysis in this study. The green highlighted areas 
in the table below represent win percentages above .500% and are considered 
“successful” while the red highlighted columns are win percentages below .500% and are 
not successful. 
 
 Overall, the data complied with my original hypothesis of teams and programs 
remaining relatively unscathed on the field as it relates to win percentage after NCAA 
sanctions. The NCAA jurisdiction is seemingly ineffective in its attempted punishment 
and deterrence of unfair competitive advantages as schools seem unscathed by sanctions. 
Of the nine total men’s basketball programs that received sanction, 87% of the seasons 
were deemed successful after the sanctions had been put in place. Of the 14 football 
programs included in the data, 92% of the seasons post-sanction were deemed successful 
expressing the relationship between sanction and on-field success. The relationship 
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showed that in almost unanimous fashion, athletic programs remain relatively unaffected 
on the field in the years following NCAA sanctions for major violations.  
Conclusions 
 Through my research on NCAA sanctions and their effect on division I football 
and men’s basketball programs relating to on-field success, the data has provided 
evidence in my hypothesis of ineffective punishment by the governing body of college 
athletics. A large portion of the programs that committed major violations in this time 
period remained successful on the field in the years following the sanctions that they 
received. 
 The NCAA is the governing body for a total of 350 divisions I men’s basketball 
programs and 249 division I football programs, 124 of those at the FBS level. The NCAA 
encourages fair and equal competition throughout but as in any industry; there are many 
looking for a competitive advantage whether it is achieved in an ethical way or not. 
Cheating is something that occurs both behind closed doors and publically through the 
NCAA’s efforts to enforce their rules by handing down sanctions for the varying 
violations.  
The violations are divided into two tiers, major and secondary. Major violations 
entice a drastic competitive advantage for a certain program or department while 
secondary violations are isolated and provide somewhat of a minor competitive 
advantage. The enforcement staff processes approximately 4,000 secondary violations 
per year.  The penalties for secondary violations typically are not of a type that would 
have long term effects on a program. The sanctions for major violations are much more 
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severe and the purpose of them is to punish the programs so severely that it deters them 
from cheating. Much of the literature review discussed earlier reflects on inadequate 
punishments by the NCAA and the need for reform in the jurisdiction process as it is easy 
to avoid and escape. The privacy of programs and their ability to fly under the radar 
allows them to commit violations that the NCAA can’t see or prove.  
In addition, there are avoidance techniques for players and coaches to remain 
unscathed from sanctions as they are able to leave the program before sanctions are in 
place. There have been numerous past studies done on these avoidance techniques as well 
as the inadequate punishment of the NCAA seemingly reinforcing cheating as the 
sanctions don’t have a lasting effect on the success of the programs, aside from the death 
penalty which seems to have a length recovery period. My study looked at the physical 
records of the programs with major violations in attempt to see if the sanctions had an 
effect on their immediate on-field win percentage in the time period following the 
sanctions. The past studies done on avoidance techniques and inadequate punishments are 
further reinforced through this data collection. This data has shown that in addition to 
avoidance techniques, cheating is further reinforced through the lack of lasting effects on 
the success of college athletic programs. 
 Since there had been no analysis of actual program records and success, just 
inadequate punishments as they relate to NCAA enforcement, I believe this research can 
further aid in the reform of NCAA jurisdiction. Throughout the years it has been proven 
ineffective, intermittent and resistant to change. Numerous efforts are being made in the 
area of reform to the NCAA as a governing body and I believe a numerical representation 
of programs committing the most severe types of violation, yet remaining unaffected on 
RUNNING HEAD: NCAA SANCTIONS  26 
the field, will further push the NCAA to reform their jurisdiction in an attempt to promote 
equal competition throughout. These efforts are being expressed through scholarly 
journals on various levels such as Adam Marsh in his call for dissent and further 
independence in the NCAA infractions process, which was shown in the Cardozo Arts & 
Entertainment Law Journal in 2009. 
 My interpretation of this data proves my hypothesis of teams remaining 
unaffected on the field following NCAA sanction, and in fact the NCAA is nearly 
reinforcing these schools to commit violations as it has been proven in the past that most 
programs that gain a competitive advantage through violation and are sanctioned, still 
remain successful on the field. Although it cannot be fully proven that the sanctions 
themselves result in a team’s failure or success, the data shows teams continuing to thrive 
on the field even after they have received sanctions for major violations against the 
NCAA. 
 With the assistance of past literature regarding NCAA jurisdiction, guidelines, 
past violations and NCAA reform I was able to conduct research analyzing the effect that 
NCAA sanctions had on certain programs winning percentages. I looked at both men’s 
basketball and football programs at the division I level that have committed major 
violations since the year 2000. Of the programs analyzed, around 80% remained 
unaffected on the field as it relates to win percentages in the seasons immediately 
following the NCAA sanctions. In a sense, this reinforced programs to gain unfair 
competitive advantages without a lasting effect on their success.  I believe this 
information will further enforce the NCAA to reform itself as a governing body to 
enforce fair and equal competition throughout the world of collegiate athletics.  
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Future Recommendations 
 My future recommendations to aid further research into the relationship between 
NCAA sanctions for major violations and on-field success of athletic programs would 
provide an even more in depth analysis of the relationship. 
 Analyzing the complete history of major violators regardless the sport, history of 
success or time period would provide a well-rounded data pool to see the variety of 
results of athletic success in the years following the sanctions. In addition to athletic 
success, the identification of finances as they relate to major violations and sanctions 
would be a fascinating look into the financial side of college athletics. The NCAA and its 
programs are driven through massive amounts of finances and the relationship between 
the possible financial losses/gains that a program accrues during a probation period of 
NCAA sanctions would be an interesting look at the impact these sanctions can have.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RUNNING HEAD: NCAA SANCTIONS  28 
References 
Baxter, V. V., Margavio, A. V., & Lambert, C. C. (1996). Competition, legitimation, and 
the regulation of intercollegiate athletics. Sociology of Sport Journal, (1), 51-64. 
Carroll, C. (2012). NCAA considers tougher penalties for head coaches. Journal Of 
NCAA Compliance, 3 (1), 4-15. 
Clark, R. S., & Batista, P. J. (2009). Do BCS national championships lead to recruiting 
violations? A Trend Analysis of NCAA Division I (FBS) Infractions. Journal Of 
Sport Administration & Supervision, 1(1), 8-22.  
Cullen, F. T., Latessa, E. J., & Jonson, C. (2012). Assessing the extent and sources of 
ncaa rule infractions. Criminology & Public Policy, 11(4), 667-706. 
Danna, J. G. (1998). Division I-A football recruiting violations reported by the National 
Collegiate Athletic Association from 1980 through 1996. 
Dittmore, S. W., & Crow, C. M. (2010). The influence of the Bowl Championship Series 
on competitive balance in college football. Journal Of Sport Administration & 
Supervision, 2(1), 7-19. 
Depken, C. A., & Wilson, D. P. (2006). NCAA enforcement and competitive balance in 
college football. Southern Economic Journal, 72(4), 826-845. 
Dohrmann, G., & Epstein, D. (2011). The fall of Jim Tressell. Sports Illustrated, 114(23), 
40-48. 
Feinglass, E. (2012). University of connecticut athletics. Retrieved from 
http://www.uconnhuskies.com/sports/w-baskbl/stats/2010-2011/teamcume.html 
Fusco, C. (2011). Weighing the u and the death penalty. Journal Of NCAA Compliance, 
2-6. 
Hackney, J. (2011). Former basketball coach at tennessee slammed by division I 
committee on infractions. Journal of NCAA Compliance, 2. 
Hackney, J. (2012). Infractions committee slams radford coaches for violations. Journal 
of NCAA Compliance, 10. 
Harden, J. (2011). NCAA committee punishes samford for secondary violations. Journal 
Of NCAA Compliance, 4-6. 
Humphreys, B. R. (2012). NCAA rule infractions. Criminology & Public Policy, 11(4), 
707-712. 
Johnson, C. C. (1992). The rules of the game. U.S. News & World Report, 112(14), 60. 
Jones, M. (2012). The role of counsel in the ncaa infractions enforcement process - part 
1. Journal Of NCAA Compliance, 8-9. 
RUNNING HEAD: NCAA SANCTIONS  29 
Lederman, D. (2011, February 2). Half of big-time ncaa programs had major violations. 
Retrieved from http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/college/2011-02-07-ncaa-
infractions_N.htm  
Marsh, G. A. (2009). A call for dissent and further independence in the NCAA 
infractions process. Cardozo Arts & Entertainment Law Journal, 26(3), 695-717. 
McGee, R. (2011). The most scandalous year ever in college sports…until next year. 
ESPN Magazine, (9), 52-58. 
Mitten, M. J., Musselman, J. L., & Burton, B. W. (2010). Targeted reform of 
commercialized intercollegiate athletics. San Diego Law Review, (3), 779-844. 
NCAA. (2013). About the ncaa. Retrieved from 
http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/ncaa/about the ncaa  
NCAA. (2013, January 21). Glossary of terms. Retrieved from 
http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/NCAA/Enforcement/Resources/Gl
ossary 
NCAA. Summary of ncaa regualtions- ncaa division 1. (2011). Retrieved from 
\\documentcenter.ncaa.org\DavWWWRoot\msaa\ama\Compliance\Compliance 
Forms\2011-12\DI_JK:jh_06282011 
Otto, K. (2005). Major Violations and NCAA 'powerhouse' football programs: What are 
the odds of being charged?. Journal Of Legal Aspects Of Sport, 15(1), 39-57. 
Penrose, M. (2012). Tattoos, tickets, and other tawdry behavior: How universities use 
federal law to hide their scandals. Cardozo Law Review, (4), 1555-1600. 
Pierce, D., & Clavio, G. (2011). From Dickens to sampson an examination of ncaa rules 
violations at indiana university. Indiana Magazine Of History, (2), 123-152.. 
Polite, F. G., Waller, S. N., Trendafilova, S. A., & Spearman, L. (2011). Social 
accountability and responsibility in sport: An examination of the national 
collegiate athletic association. Sport Science Review, (1/2), 111. 
Polsinello, D. (2011). West Virginia university football commits major violations. 
Journal Of NCAA Compliance, 6-8. 
Potuto, J. R. (2010). The NCAA rules adoption, interpretation, enforcement, and 
infractions processes: The laws that regulate them and the nature of court review. 
Vanderbilt Journal Of Entertainment & Technology Law, (2), 257-332. 
Ramos, R. (2011). Division I leaders call for sweeping changes to college athletics. 
NCAA News, 1. 
Ribock, J. (2012). The NCAA: enabling cheating since 1910 by inadequately punishing 
cheating coaches. THE NCAA: Mississippi Sports Law Review, 2(1), 389-409. 
RUNNING HEAD: NCAA SANCTIONS  30 
Sefner, H. (2012). Ohio state athletics. Retrieved from 
http://www.ohiostatebuckeyes.com/facilities/ohio-stadium.html 
Stangel, K. K. (2000). Protecting universities' economic interests: Holding student-
athletes and coaches accountable for willful violations of NCAA rules. Marquette 
Sports Law Review, 11(1), 137-160. 
Sturgis, L. (2011). NCAA imposes harsh penalties on Georgia Tech. Journal Of NCAA 
Compliance, 3-6. 
Sturgis, L. (2011). NCAA tags Boise State with lack of institutional control. Journal Of 
NCAA Compliance, 6-16. 
Taylor, P. (2010). No-win situation. Sports Illustrated, (11), 80. 
Thomas, R. (2012). UNC Punished by NCAA, Catches Break With Timing. Journal of 
NCAA Compliance, 7. 
Wagner, K. (2013). Oregon to meet with committee on infranctions following failed 
pursuit of summary disposition. Journal of NCAA Compliance, 10. 
Winfree, J. (2010). College athletes and NCAA violations introduction. Criminology & 
Public Policy, (4), 661-663. 
Winfree, J. A., & McCluskey, J. J. (2008). Incentives for post-apprehension self-sanction: 
University self-sanctions for ncaa infractions. International Journal Of Sport 
Finance, (4), 196-209. 
Winn, L., & Hess, D. (2011). The case for defense. Sports Illustrated, (19), 52-61.  
 
 
 
 
